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This study develops an analytical framework to account for sources of rapid economic 
growth in China.  The traditional Solow approach includes only two sources, i.e. increased use 
of inputs and technical change. We expanded the approach to include a third source of 
economic growth—structural change.  The empirical results show that structural change has 
contributed to growth significantly by reallocating resources from low productivity to high 
productivity sectors, especially by moving labor from agricultural production to rural 
enterprises.  We also found that the returns to capital investment in both agricultural 
production and rural enterprises are much higher than those in urban sectors, indicating 
underinvestment in rural areas.  On the other hand, labor productivity in the agricultural sector 
remains low, a result of the still large surpluses of labor in the sector.  Therefore, the further 
development of rural enterprises and increase in labor flow among sectors and across regions 
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In the past twenty years the Chinese economy has performed spectacularly well. Gross 
domestic product (GDP) has grown at 9.8 percent per year from 1978 to 1998, with some 
slowing recently as the impact of the Asian financial crisis has hit China.  The economy has 
also undergone dramatic and continuing structural change.  While there have been significant 
increases in agricultural productivity, the share of agriculture has declined as the 
manufacturing and services sectors have grown much faster.  A large amount of surplus labor 
has been absorbed by the non-agricultural sectors, especially rural enterprises.  
China is the only socialist system that has remained socialist, but it has instituted 
market reforms that appear to have succeeded in overcoming the economic failures that led to 
the collapse of the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  This success 
raises a number of questions.  Perhaps the most important is whether the performance of the 
past twenty years can be sustained in the future.  To answer this question, we need to 
understand what have been the driving forces behind past Chinese growth and whether those 
forces can continue into the future.  
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In this paper, we analyze the past sources of Chinese growth. The standard economics 
literature on analyzing the sources of aggregate growth considers two sources: increases in 
factor inputs (land, labor, and capital) and total factor productivity growth (TFPG) or technical 
change.
1 To these, we add a third: growth attributed to reallocating resources from low-
productivity to high-productivity sectors.
2 We present an empirical analytical framework that 
supports this analysis and use it to address a number of important issues.  
Has China's past rapid economic growth come mainly from capital accumulation 
(investment), which was a major source of growth in other Asian economies like Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore? How important has been total factor productivity 
growth? Given the rapid rate of structural change in China over this period, what has been the 
contribution to aggregate growth from efficiency gains achieved through reallocating 
resources among economic sectors? Accounting for the sources of Chinese economic growth 
is particularly important as the country searches for the engine of future economic growth. If 
past rapid growth has been realized predominantly through structural change, which inevitably 
slows as the structure of the economy (e.g., the shares of agriculture, industry, and services) 
reaches a new balance, then future growth may be slower. If this is the case, increasing total 
factor productivity within sectors through investment in technology and infrastructure may be 
especially important for future growth. 
 
                                                            
1 Technical change in this study is broadly defined to include both changes in 
technology and improvements in technical efficiency.  
2 There have been numerous studies analyzing the sources of growth in China, but 
few have considered the role of structural change. See Wang (1999), Maddison (1998), 
World Bank (1997), Kim and Lau (1996), Wu (1995), and Wu and Wu (1995).  
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To consider the role of structural change, we divide the economy into four sectors: 
urban industry, urban services, agriculture, and rural enterprises. In our analysis, we estimate 
production functions for the four economic sectors using provincial time series data for 1978-
95. The rural enterprise sector includes all non-farm activities such as rural industry, 
construction, transportation, and commerce. The separation of rural enterprises from other 
sectors is particularly important, as we will show that the development of the rural non-farm 
sector has been the major engine of growth in the economy since the institutional reforms in 
1978. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present data on structural change and the 
increased use of inputs in the Chinese economy over the past several decades. Next we present 
a conceptual framework to decompose economic growth into different components. We then 
describe data sources, followed by the estimation of production functions for the four sectors. 
Using these estimated production functions and historical data on factor accumulation, we 
analyze the sources of economic growth. Finally, we conclude by offering some insights into 





2. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
 
The literature on growth and structural change is extensive.
3 It is often argued that 
countries pass through phases during the course of development. Kuznets and Chenery focus 
on the process of industrialization as the driving force of  “modern economic growth”—
Kuznets’ term. Clark (1951) distinguishes between primary, secondary, and tertiary 
production and describes the process of structural change as  “... the most important 
concomitant of economic progress, namely the movement of working population from 
agriculture to manufacture and from manufacture to commerce and services.”  
Although, the development path of the Chinese economy is consistent with the 
industrialization process described by Chenery et al. (1986), the Chinese experience has some 
unique features.  During the last two decades, China underwent both rapid industrialization 
and dramatic transition from a planned to a market economy. The two processes were 
complementary.  Without a successful transition, the industrialization process would have 
been much slower.  The Chinese national economy grew at 7.7 percent per year from 1952 to 
1997 (Table 1), with growth rates accelerating over time. During the pre-reform period 1957-
77, the annual growth rate was less than six percent. It accelerated to 9.5 percent during the  
                                                            
3 Classics include Clark (1951), Kuznets (1966), and Chenery and Syrquin (1979). 
Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986) summarize much of the earlier cross-country 
comparative work and survey earlier studies on the sources of growth in developing 
countries.  Temple (1999) updated more recent studies on cross-country analysis of 
sources of economic growth.   
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reform period of 1978-1989, and to 11 percent in the 1990s.
4  All sectors have grown 
rapidly, but at different rates. Agriculture grew at 5.3 percent per year, while urban 
industry and urban services grew at 8.6 percent and 7.1 percent, respectively.
5  Rural 
enterprises grew at 21.6 percent per year from 1978 to 1997, a rate that few economies 
have ever achieved for a sustained period.
6 In 1997, GDP produced by rural industry in 
China was larger than the GDP of the entire industrial sector of India.
7  
                                                            
4 There have been several attempts to reconstruct the national GDP figures for 
China. Maddison (1998) estimated a 7.5 percent annual growth rate for the period of 
1978-95, 2.2 percent lower than the official figure. His estimated level of 1987 GDP, 
however, is 16 percent higher than official SSB data. The major differences come from 
the weights use in aggregating total output, and the inflation deflators used. Moreover, 
Maddison's figures were derived from gross production value or net production value, 
while Chinese official data were constructed using the standard system of national 
accounts (SNA) in aggregating GDP at the provincial level. Wu and Wu (1994) also 
constructed GDP figures for China. Their estimated GDP level in 1978 was 12 percent 
higher than the official released figure, but their growth rate of GDP (8.6 percent per 
annum) is 0.4 percentage point lower than the SSB rate (9.0 percent) for 1978-91. In this 
study, we use Chinese official data because of the availability of provincial data recently 
published by SSB in 1997.  
5 The annual growth rate of agricultural GDP is higher than that of gross 
production, which was 4.25 percent per year from 1952 to 1995 (Fan 1997). The 
difference comes mainly from the fact that intermediate inputs in agriculture (such as 
fertilizers) have grown substantially. The ratio of the value of intermediate inputs to value 
added has risen, which is characteristic of agriculture in the development process.  
6 The GDP of rural enterprises may have been over-reported, but to what extent, 
and how it changes over time and across regions, is difficult to judge. In 1997, SSB 
conducted a comprehensive agricultural census that included more than 1,000 surveyed 
items. The authors are in the process of getting access to this census and may use the data 
as a benchmark to adjust both employment and GDP data for rural enterprises. However, 
rapid growth in rural industry is evidenced all over China, particularly in coastal regions. 
7 Calculated by the authors using data from the World Development Report, 1999.  
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Table 1 Sectoral GDP and input growth by sector 
Period  Total  Agriculture  Urban Industry  Urban Service  Rural Enterprise 
           
GDP           
           
 1952-77  5.93  3.66  9.43  5.10  n.a. 
 1978-89  9.50  8.38  6.47  13.91  19.27 
 1990-97  11.18  5.27  10.27  7.04  27.86 
           
 1978-97  9.81  7.25  7.32  11.00  21.56 
 1952-97  7.68  5.32  8.66  7.06  n.a. 
           
Labor           
           
 1952-77  2.60  2.13  5.55  3.59  n.a. 
 1978-89  2.96  1.12  3.67  3.66  15.49 
 1990-97  1.23  -1.46  1.18  8.25  4.26 
           
 1978-97  2.94  0.90  2.86  6.65  11.01 
 1952-97  2.73  1.56  4.50  4.02  n.a. 
            
Capital Stock         
           
 1978-89  8.54  2.28  9.97  8.90  11.75 
 1990-95  9.25  6.00  6.69  10.60  18.11 
           
 1978-95  8.70  3.40  8.92  9.38  13.20 
Note: All the numbers are percent. 
Sources: Calculated from various China State Statistical Bureau (SSB) publications. 
 
 
As a result of differential sectoral growth rates, the Chinese economy has experienced 
massive structural transformation over the past several decades (Figure 1). In 1952, agriculture 
accounted for more than half of GDP, while urban industry and services accounted for 21 
percent and 29 percent, respectively. The Chinese economy was largely agrarian. But by 1997 
the share of agriculture had declined to about 20 percent of GDP—a decline of about two-
thirds of a percentage point per year, which is a rapid rate of structural change. The most 
dramatic change has been the rapid increase of rural enterprises. In 1997, rural enterprises  
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accounted for more than a quarter of aggregate GDP, while this sector was almost nonexistent 
even as late as 1978.  
Labor shifts among sectors have been phenomenal. In 1952, more than 80 percent of 
the national labor force was in the agricultural sector, only six percent in urban industry, and 
ten percent in the urban service sector. By 1997, less than half of the labor force was engaged 
in agricultural activities. More than 13 percent was in the urban industry sector, and ten 
percent in the urban service sector. Rural enterprises employed over one-fifth of the total labor 
in 1997 (Figure 1).  
In 1978, agriculture accounted for 20 percent of the total capital stock, while urban 
industry and services accounted for 38 and 33 percent, respectively, and rural enterprises 
accounted for only six percent. By 1997, given slow growth in agricultural capital investment, 
the share of agriculture in the total capital stock declined dramatically to 8.8 percent. Both 
urban industry and services have increased their shares to 44.5 and 38.7 percent, respectively. 
Although the total absolute amount of rural enterprise capital stock has grown rapidly (13 
percent per year), the growth has been slower than the growth in the sector’s GDP over the 
period 1978-95 (Figure 1).  
There was a large difference in labor productivity among sectors in 1952 (table 2). The 
average productivity of labor in urban industry was 5.8 times larger than in agriculture, 
indicating a large potential efficiency gain from reallocating labor from   
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agriculture to industry. Over time, the rise of rural enterprises has absorbed huge amounts of 
surplus labor in the rural areas, indicating that the efficiency of the whole economy has gained 
by reallocating these resources to higher productivity sectors. The average labor productivity 
difference remained large throughout the period, narrowing only to 5.4 by 1995 (Table 2).  
In spite of rapid growth of the capital stock, capital productivity in China has actually 
increased over time (Table 3). For every 100 Yuan of capital stock, 39 Yuan of GDP was 
produced in 1978, which increased to 46 Yuan in 1995. Over time, rural areas (agriculture and 
rural enterprises) have shown strongly increasing trends in capital productivity, indicating 
more investment in rural areas is justified. But the share of capital investment in rural areas 
has declined, and consequently capital productivity in rural areas (109 for agriculture and 90 
for rural enterprises) is two to three times larger than that in urban sectors in 1995.   
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Table 2  Labor productivity growth by sector 
Year  Average  Agriculture  Urban Industry  Urban Services  Rural Enterprise 
    1978 constant yuan / worker   
           
1952  371  224  1,290  1,015  n.a. 
1953  416  230  1,515  1,216  n.a. 
1954  424  233  1,518  1,266  n.a. 
1955  443  246  1,724  1,241  n.a. 
1956  495  265  2,261  1,084  n.a. 
1957  503  250  2,536  1,176  n.a. 
1958  545  319  1,215  626  n.a. 
1959  603  259  2,345  686  n.a. 
1960  608  216  2,350  858  n.a. 
1961  447  210  1,640  1,008  n.a. 
1962  417  200  1,981  1,080  n.a. 
1963  446  218  2,405  1,044  n.a. 
1964  507  237  2,928  1,141  n.a. 
1965  574  267  3,160  1,290  n.a. 
1966  612  282  3,509  1,259  n.a. 
1967  558  275  2,876  1,221  n.a. 
1968  516  267  2,458  1,166  n.a. 
1969  580  270  2,900  1,359  n.a. 
1970  668  291  3,317  1,467  n.a. 
1971  692  296  3,215  1,463  n.a. 
1972  713  297  3,150  1,505  n.a. 
1973  752  319  3,207  1,583  n.a. 
1974  755  327  3,087  1,552  n.a. 
1975  803  337  3,270  1,516  n.a. 
1976  776  336  2,917  1,399  n.a. 
1977  824  325  3,178  1,459  n.a. 
1978  903  362  3,335  1,738  808 
1979  950  419  3,197  1,759  833 
1980  992  424  3,201  1,911  873 
1981  1,012  459  3,037  2,245  748 
1982  1,065  511  2,963  2,720  677 
1983  1,152  558  3,109  2,615  844 
1984  1,278  627  3,298  3,051  775 
1985  1,401  670  3,958  3,510  665 
1986  1,484  706  4,021  3,764  767 
1987  1,608  758  4,278  4,064  884 
1988  1,739  793  4,444  4,641  1,027 
1989  1,777  776  4,473  4,904  1,152 
1990  1,597  727  4,087  4,024  1,088 
1991  1,720  721  4,290  4,471  1,219 
1992  1,942  737  4,884  5,193  1,561 
1993  2,178  754  5,353  6,051  2,086 
1994  2,423  901  6,639  4,867  2,395 
1995  2,648  1,026  5,601  5,177  3,276 
           
Annual Growth Rate         
 1952-77  3.25  1.50  3.67  1.46  n.a. 
 1978-89  6.35  7.18  2.70  9.89  3.27 
 1990-95  10.64  7.13  6.51  5.17  24.67 
 1978-95  6.54  6.32  3.10  6.63  8.58 
 1952-95  4.68  3.60  3.47  3.86  n.a. 
Sources: Calculated from various SSB publications. 
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Table 3 Capital productivity growth by sector 






           
    1978 constant yuan per 100 Yuan Capital Stock 
           
1978  39  55  48  20  24 
1979  39  63  46  20  23 
1980  39  63  46  22  23 
1981  39  69  42  23  23 
1982  40  78  40  24  23 
1983  41  85  40  25  25 
1984  43  91  41  27  28 
1985  43  93  41  28  35 
1986  43  97  38  29  39 
1987  43  102  38  30  43 
1988  44  106  36  33  47 
1989  42  105  34  33  48 
1990  41  111  30  33  48 
1991  42  107  30  36  51 
1992  44  106  32  38  59 
1993  46  103  34  37  74 
1994  47  109  40  33  74 
1995  46  109  32  33  90 
           
Annual Growth Rate       
           
1978-89  0.88  5.97  -3.19  4.60  6.73 
 1990-95  2.52  -0.30  1.07  -0.27  13.17 
           
 1978-95  1.09  4.07  -2.43  2.82  8.15 





3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Chinese economic reforms began in the rural sector. Prior to the reforms, most 
resource allocation was subject to government controls. Labor allocation had long been tightly 
controlled by the government through the household-registration and food-rationing system in 
the cities. The agricultural population could only engage in agricultural production. Migration 
of labor was prohibited between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, and between rural 
and urban areas. As the population increased and technology improved, a huge labor surplus 
developed in rural China. It was estimated that one third of rural labor (about one hundred 
million workers) was underemployed prior to the reforms.  
Beginning in 1979, efforts were made by the government to improve incentives in 
agriculture and to stimulate output by decentralizing production and increasing the 
responsibility of household units (the so-called “household production responsibility system”) 
whereby land is still collectively owned, but the use rights were distributed by collectives 
based on the number of persons and/or laborers in each family. Under the household 
responsibility system, farm households signed contracts with collectives delineating each 
other's obligations and responsibilities. The initial contracts were of 15 years’ duration. By 
1984, more than 99 percent of the country's production teams had adopted the household 
production responsibility system. Various studies have demonstrated that rural reform during 
this period substantially increased production efficiency, productivity, and farmer income 
(McMillian et al. 1989, Fan 1991, Lin 1992).  
Rapid growth in agricultural labor productivity and rural income increased rural 
demand and provided a great opportunity for farmers to develop the non-agricultural rural 
sector. In addition, rural laborers were finally permitted to leave agricultural production to  
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work for rural industry and services, and also to migrate to work in urban areas. The 
percentage of rural laborers engaged in the rural non-farm sector increased from six percent in 
1978 to 25 percent in 1997. Similarly, many farmers migrated to urban centers to work in both 
industry and services. The rapid development of rural industry and services not only provided 
a demonstration of the potential gains from reform, but also created competitive pressure for 
urban sectors to reform as well. Without successful reforms in agriculture, which increased 
agricultural productivity and released resources to work elsewhere, and rapid development of 
the rural non-farm sector, the reforms and rapid growth in the urban sector since 1984 would 
have been impossible.  
Chinese urban sector reforms did not begin formally until 1984. Various reforms that 
were enacted piecemeal during 1978-84 were considerably expanded in 1984, but the 1984 
reform package was far from the “big bang” programs then being advocated for Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. In particular, China's urban-sector reforms emphasized 
an expansion of enterprise and local autonomy and incentives, and the reduction—but not 
elimination—of within-plan allocations. The results have been encouraging. Productivity has 
increased and the returns to factors converged significantly across sectors (Chen et al. 1992). 
Wu (1995) used panel data to decompose growth into technological change and technical 
efficiency change in three Chinese sectors, and found that productivity in agriculture, rural 
industry, and state industry all grew very quickly from 1985 to 1991.  
There is a vast literature analyzing rapid economic growth in China. To date, few 
studies have considered the role of structural change as a source of economic growth in China. 
Chow (1993) estimated production functions and marginal returns to capital and labor for five 
sectors of the Chinese economy, carefully constructing capital stock data for each sector. He  
 
14
found that there was a declining difference in returns to capital, and an increasing difference in 
returns to labor, among sectors for the period of 1952-85. Borensztein and Ostry (1996) also 
suggest that the large gain in total factor productivity (TFP) was caused by labor relocation 
from rural to industrial and urban sectors, rather than pure technical progress.  
Few economists have tried to quantify the contribution to aggregate growth from 
reallocating resources among sectors over time. Robinson (1972) presented a model which 
explicitly accounts for the contribution to aggregate growth of resource transfers between 
agriculture and non-agriculture, and estimated the model using cross-country data. Feder 
(1986) used the same analytic model to estimate, also using cross-country data, the 
contribution to aggregate growth of transfers of resources between non-export and export 
sectors. Sonobe and Otsuka (1997) demonstrated the significance of changing industrial 
structure in economic growth in prewar Japan by decomposing labor productivity.  In these 
models, the gap in marginal productivity of factors across sectors is assumed to be constant 
over time, and they make no assumptions about the form of the sectoral production functions. 
In this paper, we present an analytic framework that includes explicit sectoral production 
functions, using a flexible functional form that supports econometric estimation and can 
incorporate different types of productivity growth, as well as capture the effect of resource 
transfers on aggregate growth.  
To decompose the impact of resource transfers on growth, start by defining 
allocatively efficient GDP as the value of GDP when inputs have been allocated so that the 
marginal returns to all inputs are equal across sectors (we will use the term “efficient GDP” 
hereafter). The efficiency index, E, is the ratio of actual GDP, Y, to efficient GDP, Y'. 
  ' Y / Y E =  (1)  
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For many reasons, including policy changes, sectoral allocative efficiency may change 
over time. Growth in actual GDP can be decomposed into growth in efficient GDP and 






































i S  = Y'i /Y'  is the share of i in total GDP.  
To perform sources accounting using this equation, we need: (1) to have an explicit 
specification of sectoral production functions, and then (2) to determine the allocation of 
factors across sectors so that sectoral marginal products are all equal —the allocation 
consistent with competitive equilibrium in all factor markets. We start by assuming that real 
value added (GDP) by sector follows a well-behaved, neoclassical production function: 
  ( ), T , X ,... X ,... X f Y imt ijt t i it it 1 =  (4) 
 
where Xijt is input j for sector i in year t. A thornier question is what functional form of the 
production function should be used. Considering both econometric estimation and theoretical 
consistency, we specify the following functional form:  
  ( ) . t a t ) (X b ) (X b t a a Y itt ijt ijt j ijt ij j it i it
2
0 ln ln ln + + + + = ￿ ￿  (5) 
or 
  ( ) ). (X B A Y ijt
ijt j it it ln ln ￿ + =  (6) 
 
where Ait = ai0 + ait t + aitt t
2, and Bijt = bij + bijt t. Within each time period (fixed t), the 


















Over time, both neutral and biased technical changes are allowed in every sector, since all the 
coefficients potentially vary over time.  
For any given year, the efficient allocation of resources can be determined by 
computing the allocation of resources such that the marginal product of each factor j is the 
same across all sectors i. The computational problem is equivalent to solving a small 
computable general equilibrium model of the factor markets assuming that product prices are 
fixed.
8 The result is a set of efficient resource allocations, X'ijt and outputs Y'it.  Taking the first 































The first term of equation (8) represents the effect of neutral technical change while 
the second term measures the effect of biased technical change for sector i. The final term is 
the effects of increased use of inputs. For simplicity, we aggregate the first and second terms 





                                                            
8 We solve for the efficient allocation using the GAMS software. See Brooke, 
Kendrick, and Meeraus (1992) for a description of the software.  
9 Since even within a sector, productivity can also increase by reallocating 
resources, the first and second terms may reflect within-sector allocative changes. The 
two terms together measure growth in sectoral total factor productivity (i.e., total output 





Both nominal GDP and real GDP growth indices for various sectors are available 
from SSB's The Gross Domestic Product of China (SSB, 1997a). The data sources and 
construction of national GDP estimates was published by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB, 
1997b). This publication indicates that the SSB has used the U.N. standard SNA (system of 
national accounts) definitions to estimate GDP for 29 provinces by three economic sectors 
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) in mainland China for the period of 1952-95. Since 1995, 
the China Statistical Yearbook has published GDP data every year for each province by the 
same three sectors. Both nominal and real growth rates are available from SSB official 
publications.  
We use four sectors in our analysis: agriculture, urban industry, urban services, and 
rural enterprises. The agriculture sector is equivalent to the primary sector used by SSB. The 
following procedures were used to construct GDP for the other three sectors. Until 1996, 
China published annual gross production value for rural industry and services. In 1996, they 
began to publish value added figures. The definition of value added is GDP originating in the 
sector, the data we need.  The Ministry of Agriculture published data on both gross production 
value and value added for rural industry (including construction) and services in China's 
Agricultural Yearbook, 1996. The data on  nominal value added for rural industry and services 
prior to 1995 were estimated using the growth rate of gross production value and 1995 value-
added figures, assuming no change in the ratio of value added to gross production value.  
GDP for rural industry was subtracted from GDP for industry as a whole (or the 
secondary sector as classified by SSB) to obtain GDP for urban industry. Similarly, GDP for  
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rural services was subtracted from aggregate service sector GDP (or the tertiary sector as 
classified by SSB) to obtain GDP for the urban service sector. GDP for rural enterprises is the 
sum of GDP for rural industry and rural services.  
The implicit GDP deflators by province for the three sectors are estimated by dividing 
nominal GDP by real GDP. These deflators are then used to deflate nominal GDP for rural 
industry and services to obtain their GDP in real terms.  
 
LABOR 
Labor input data for the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors at the provincial level 
after 1989 can be found in SSB's Statistical Yearbooks (various issues), while provincial labor 
data prior to 1989 are available in SSB (1990). Labor is measured in stock terms as the 
number of persons at the end of each year. For rural industry and services, prior to 1984, labor 
input data at the township and village level, but not at the individual household level, are 
available in SSB's Rural Statistical Yearbooks. The omission of individual-household, non-
farm employment data will not cause serious problems as the share of this category in rural 
employment was minimal prior to 1984. Urban industry labor is estimated by subtracting rural 
industry labor from total industry labor, and urban service labor is similarly estimated as total 





Capital stocks for the four sectors are calculated from data on gross capital formation 
and annual fixed asset investment. For the three sectors classified by SSB, the data on gross 
capital formation by province after 1978 was published by SSB (1997). Gross capital 
formation is defined as the value of fixed assets and inventory acquired minus the value of 
fixed assets and inventory disposed. To construct a capital stock series from data on capital 
formation, we used the following procedure. Define the capital stock in time t as the stock in 
time t-1 plus investment minus depreciation: 
 
  . K I K 1 - t t t ä) (1- + =  (9) 
 
where Kt  is the capital stock in year t, It  is gross capital formation in year t, and d is the 
depreciation rate. China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, 1995) reports the depreciation rate of 
fixed assets of state owned enterprises for industry, railway, communications, commerce, and 
grain for the years 1952 to 1992. We use the rates for grain and commerce for agriculture and 
services, respectively. Since 1992, SSB has ceased to report official depreciation rates. For the 
years after 1992, we used the 1992 depreciation rates. 
To obtain initial values for the capital stock, we used a similar procedure to Kohli 
(1982). That is, we assume that prior to 1978, real investment has grown at a steady rate (r) 








=  (10) 
 
This approach ensures that the 1978 value of the capital stock is independent of the 
1978-95 data used in our analysis. Moreover, given the relatively small capital stock in 1978  
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and the high levels of investment, the estimates for later years are not sensitive to the 1978 
benchmark value of the capital stock.  
Estimates of capital stocks for rural industry and services are constructed using the 
annual fixed asset investment by province from 1978 to 1995, which are available in the 
annual China Statistical Yearbooks and the China Fixed Asset Investment Statistical 
Materials, 1950-95. Initial values are calculated using equation (10), but the growth rate of 
real investment prior to 1978 is assumed to be four percent. Again, the initial capital stock is 
low, so that the estimated series is not sensitive to the benchmark starting value.  
Capital stock for rural industry was subtracted from that of total industry (or secondary 
industry as classified by SSB) to obtain capital stock for the urban industry sector. Similarly, 
capital stock for rural services was subtracted from the aggregate service sector (or tertiary 
sector as classified by SSB) to obtain the capital stock for the urban service sector. Finally, 
capital stock for rural enterprises is the sum of capital stocks for both rural industry and 
services.  
Prior to constructing capital stocks for each sector, annual data on capital formation 
and fixed asset investment was deflated by a capital investment deflator. The SSB began to 
publish provincial price indices for fixed asset investment in 1987. Prior to 1987, we use the 
national price index of construction materials to proxy the capital investment deflator.  
 
LAND 
Land in agriculture is taken to be arable land, and data are available in various issues 
of China's Agricultural Yearbook, China's Statistical Yearbook, and China's Rural Statistical 
Yearbook. The official data on arable land areas are known to be inaccurate. Various new  
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estimates indicate that official figures under report actual acreage by as much as 30-40%. 
However, it is difficult to judge how this under-reporting varies over time and across regions. 
In this study, we simply use the official data. We also use the sown areas as the land input 
variable in the estimation of the agricultural production function. The coefficient of the land 
variable was sensitive to changes in the definition of the land variable, but using different land 





5. ESTIMATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
We have data for eighteen years (1978-95) for 28 provinces, which represents a panel 
of 504 observations. Tibet is excluded mainly because of lack of data. Hainan province, which 
was separated from Guangdong as a separate province after 1987, is still included in 
Guangdong province.  
In order to avoid the heteroscedasticity problem due to large regional differences, 
regional dummies were added to the production functions. The division of the seven regions 
are as follows: (1) Northeast (NE): Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin provinces; (2) North (N): 
Municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin; Hebei, Henan, Shangdong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu 
provinces; (3) Northwest (NW): autonomous regions of Nei Monggol, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and 
Tibet; Qinghai province; (4) Central (C): Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei provinces; (5) Southeast 
(SE): Shanghai municipality, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui provinces; (6) Southwest (SW): 
Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunan provinces; and (7) South (S): Guangxi autonomous region; 
Fujian and Guangdong provinces.
10  
The results of the estimated production functions are presented in Table 4. Regressions 
R1, R2, R3, and R4 present the results of different specifications of the production functions 
for agriculture. Regressions R1 and R2 include land as a separate input, in addition to labor 
and capital, because land is treated differently from agricultural 
                                                            
10 One could also use provincial dummies. Adding provincial dummies would not 
significantly change the results but only reduce degrees of freedom.   
 
23
Table 4 Production functions estimates by sector 
Notes: Estimates of regional dummies are not reported.   *Asterisk indicates that estimates are at the 5% significance level 
.
                 Agriculture    Urban Industry      Urban Services    Rural Enterprise 
   R1 R2 R3 R4  R5 R6  R7 R8 R9  R10 
Labor  0.367  0.543  0.627  0.805  0.581  0.634  0.428  0.337  0.249  0.314 
  (9.24)*  (9.26)*  (29.63)*  (19.01)*  (16.07)*  (10.02)*  (17.25)*  (8.25)*  (6.20)*  (4.75)* 
Capital  0.227  0.136  0.285  0.155  0.386  0.330  0.374  0.398  0.719  0.482 
  (8.14)*  (2.82)*  (10.04)*  (13.06)*  (8.81)*  (4.41)*  (19.95)*  (11.03)*  (18.33)*  (6.56)* 
Land  0.317  0.268                 
  (7.55)*  (5.39)*                 
Time Trend  0.046  0.121  0.041  0.141  0.041  -0.091  0.059  0.079  0.101  -0.091 
  (18.22)*  (5.16)*  (16.02)*  (7.91)*  (9.26)*  (-5.00)*  (22.05)*  (5.25)*  (19.67)*  (-5.00)* 
Labor*t    -0.016    -0.017    -0.009    0.013    0.009 
    (-3.66)*    (-4.86)*    (-0.94)    (2.95)*    (1.60) 
Capital*t    0.009    0.013    0.009    -0.004    0.012 
    (2.17)*    (2.89)*    (0.96)    (-6.92)    (1.99)* 
Land*t    0.003                 
    (0.76)                 
Time Trend
2    -0.0019    -0.002    0.0007        0.005 
    (-3.76)*    (-3.96)*    (0.85)        (6.25)* 
R
2  0.920  0.924  0.910  0.918  0.891  0.891  0.925  0.933  0.923  0.939  
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capital (buildings, machinery, and livestock) in the SSB data (SSB 1997b). The SSB only 
includes capital formation from net increased land areas due to reclamation, but reclaimed 
land usually is of lower quality than the current stock of land. Using the Kohli approach would 
underestimate the initial capital stock embodied in land. We exclude land area as an input in 
regressions R3 and R4 for comparison. Fertilizer could also be included in the agricultural 
production functions, but agricultural output is measured as value-added, so intermediate 
inputs such as fertilizer are excluded from output measures by definition. Including fertilizer 
and other intermediate inputs is more appropriate in estimating a production function for gross 
output. 
Results from regression R1 indicate that, over the period of 1978-95, labor still played 
an important role in Chinese agricultural production with an elasticity of 0.367. The elasticity 
of the land input is slightly smaller than that of labor at 0.317, while that of capital is the 
smallest. The strong, positive coefficients of the time-trend variables imply that technical 
change played a vital role in promoting Chinese agricultural production during the study 
period.  
Results from Regression 2 show that the importance of labor in agricultural production 
has declined, while the role of capital has increased. The declining role of labor is particularly 
significant, with its production elasticity declining from 0.53 to 0.26. The elasticity of capital 
increased from 0.15 to 0.30. There was, however, no significant change in the role of land in 
agricultural production (the estimated elasticity went from 0.443 in 1978 to 0.409 in 1995). 
Without land as an input, the coefficient of labor in the regressions is greater and that of 
capital changes very little in 1978, while both coefficients would be overestimated in 1995 
(regressions R3 and R4).  
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The labor elasticity for urban industry was large in 1978, at 0.63, but declined rapidly 
to 0.50 in 1995 (comparing regressions R5 and R6 and taking account of the time trend on the 
labor coefficient). Capital elasticity was low at 0.34 in 1978, but increased to 0.49 in 1995. 
These results indicate that a rapid transformation occurred in the sector—it has become 
increasingly more capital intensive and less labor intensive. The urban service sector followed 
a different path. The labor elasticity increased over time from 0.35 in 1978 to 0.58 in 1995, 
while the capital elasticity changed very little (regressions R7 and R8). In contrast to urban 
industry, the urban service sector has become increasingly labor intensive.  
The most striking phenomenon in the rural enterprise sector is that both labor and 
capital elasticities have increased over time (regressions R9 and R10), implying increasing 
returns to scale in the industry. In particular, the labor elasticity increased from 0.32 in 1978 to 
0.47 in 1995; and the capital elasticity became the highest of all sectors, increasing from 0.49 
in 1978 to 0.70 in 1995. 
These estimates of sectoral production functions yield results that differ sharply from 
some previous estimates. Chow (1993), for example, found that there was technical regression 
in all sectors in China during 1952-80. He used national time-series data. Time series data on 
labor, capital, land, and the time-trend variable are highly correlated, leading to unreliable 
parameter estimates. Our results are very similar to those of Wu (1995), who estimated 
production functions for three sectors, with the exception that he reports smaller estimates for 
the labor elasticity for agriculture and the capital elasticity for state industry. However, in Wu's 
specification, parameters do not change over time, while the more flexible form in our 
regressions supports estimation of biased technical change, which was found to be significant.   
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Differences in estimated elasticities for the same input across sectors reflect 
differences in technology, but do not provide any indication of how efficiently resources are 
allocated. Efficiency of resource allocation depends on differences in the marginal 
productivity of inputs across sectors. Given the estimated parameters, the marginal product of 
each factor can be computed from equation 8. The results are shown in Figure 2. Over the 
study period, the marginal return to labor in agriculture increased very little, while that of rural 
enterprises rose sharply. In 1978, labor productivity in rural enterprises was over 50 percent 
larger than that in agriculture, implying the existence of large potential gains from reallocating 
labor from agriculture to rural industry.
11 From 1978 to 1995, more than 130 million rural 
labor workers were shifted from agricultural production to rural non-farm activities. This shift 
is perhaps the major source of efficiency gain since the reform. In the urban areas, the 
marginal returns to labor in urban industry were highest among all sectors in 1978, but 
increased rapidly in the urban service sector, rising to a level 33 percent higher than in industry 
by 1995.  
Capital in the urban industry sector had the highest marginal return in 1978. But the 
return in rural enterprises, although slightly lower than the value in urban industry in 1978, 
rose dramatically. In 1995, the return in rural enterprises was 3.6 times that in urban industry. 
The marginal return in agriculture was low and similar to the level in the urban service sector, 
but over time it increased more than three fold, and in 1995 its return was 2.0 and 2.9 times 
those in urban industry and service sectors, respectively, but only 51 percent of the value in 
rural enterprises.  
                                                            
11 The low level and stagnation of returns to labor in agriculture was also found by 
Chow (1993).  
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Table 5 presents the estimates of returns to scale for each sector. Returns to scale are 
less than one in agriculture, urban industry, and urban services. Returns to scale in agriculture 
have declined over time, while rising in urban industry and urban services. The returns to scale 
in rural enterprises were smaller than one in 1978, but have increased since, and in 1995 
reached a value of 1.2. The finding of significant increasing returns to scale in rural enterprises 
is consistent with findings from earlier studies (1.1 by Wu 1995, and 1.2 by Svejnar 1990).  
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Table 5: Returns to scale by sector 
Year  Agriculture  Urban Industry  Urban Services  Rural Enterprises 
         
1978  0.94  0.88  0.74  0.80 
1979  0.94  0.88  0.75  0.83 
1980  0.94  0.88  0.76  0.85 
1981  0.93  0.88  0.77  0.87 
1982  0.93  0.89  0.78  0.90 
1983  0.93  0.89  0.79  0.92 
1984  0.92  0.89  0.80  0.94 
1985  0.92  0.89  0.81  0.97 
1986  0.91  0.89  0.82  0.99 
1987  0.91  0.90  0.83  1.01 
1988  0.91  0.90  0.84  1.04 
1989  0.90  0.90  0.85  1.06 
1990  0.90  0.90  0.86  1.08 
1991  0.90  0.90  0.87  1.11 
1992  0.89  0.91  0.88  1.13 
1993  0.89  0.91  0.89  1.15 
1994  0.89  0.91  0.90  1.18 
1995  0.88  0.91  0.91  1.20 
              
Sources: Calculated by authors from Table 4. 
 
 
Having discussed the trends of marginal returns for each sector, we want to evaluate 
the overall divergence of marginal returns to capital and labor using the Gini coefficient. The 
Gini coefficient of the marginal returns to labor decreased from 0.47 in 1985 to 0.33 in 1995, 
while the Gini coefficient of the marginal returns to capital declined from 0.16 in 1978 to 0.11 
in 1985, and thereafter went up to 0.21 in 1995. In terms of the magnitude, the disequilibria 
for labor market is more serious than for the capital market, indicating that there still exist 
institutional barriers for labor flow.  However, the trend of the Gini coefficients is very 
different—the marginal returns to labor narrowed, but the marginal returns to capital widened.  
The fragmentation of the labor market is mainly caused by by the Hukou system 
(household registration system). The Hukou system pretty much confined people to the village 
or city of their birth (Solinger, 1993). With the success of rural reform, which freed labor from 
agricultural production, migration from rural areas to nearby towns and cities became easier,  
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narrowing the gap in the marginal returns to labor. However, cross-regional migration 
remained difficult and there are still large barriers that prevent labor from moving freely 
among sectors (Kanbur and Zhang, 1999).  For example, urban centers often impose certain 
restrictions for a non resident to live and work for "security reasons" or to protect job markets 
for their own residents, particularly those laid off by state-own enterprises.   
The initial decline in the variations in marginal returns to capital prior to 1985 is 
consistent with Chow's finding.  However, the trend reversed after 1985, indicating that the 
capital market in China is still embryonic and needs to be further developed.  The government 
still controls a large share of investment resources through its budget allocation and five major 
state banks.
12  Continued flows of financial resources to inefficient state-owned enterprises are 
a major source of inefficient capital allocation.  Poor regulation of the semi-government 
financial institutions such as the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp may also 
have contributed to inefficient capital allocation. 
Overall, in spite of movements of factors, there are indications of continuing 
disequilibrium in factor markets. Continuing inter-sectoral variations in marginal factor 
returns and in scale economies indicates significant opportunities for achieving efficiency 





                                                            
12 People's Bank of China (central bank), Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Bank of China (specialized bank for foreign currency), Agricultural Bank of 
China, and Construction Bank of China.  
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6. ACCOUNTING FOR SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Using equations 2, 3, and 7, the sources of growth of GDP can be decomposed as 
shown in Table 6. To calculate the source of growth due to structural change, we used the 
following procedure. We first simulate allocatively efficient GDP for 1978 by solving for the 
allocation of labor and capital such that the marginal returns to each factor are equal across all 
four sectors. The efficiency index was then calculated as the ratio of actual GDP to efficient 
GDP. We used the same method to calculate the efficiency index for 1995. The contribution 
of structural change is then calculated as the change in the efficiency index as a percentage of 
the change in GDP (equation 2).
13  
Figure 3 presents estimates of the allocative efficiency index for the period 1978-95. 
The index was about 0.57 in 1978, indicating there was large inefficiency in allocating 
resources among sectors. After 1978, the index rose steadily to 0.68 in 1985. During this 
period, agricultural productivity improved sharply due to rural reforms and surplus labor was 
shifted to non-farm activities, leading to the rapid development of rural enterprises. Allocative 
efficiency improved very little from 1985 to 1991, the period when the effects of the first 
phase of rural reforms were largely exhausted, and urban sectors were struggling with gradual 
reforms. Since 1991, the index has begun to rise steadily, probably reflecting aggressive 
government policy reforms in the urban sectors which have resulted in increased productivity 
growth and widened the gap between marginal factor returns across sectors. During this 
period, both urban industry and rural enterprises experienced rapid growth. 
                                                            
13 In this study, we ignore the effects of demand and price changes on structural 
change.  One could take shifts in demand into account by using a full CGE model, if the 
demand side could be fully specified.   
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Large amounts of rural labor were shifted out of agriculture. For the first time, employment in 
agriculture began to decline absolutely (-1.46% per year).  
To calculate the contribution of growth in productivity within a particular sector, we 
first calculate the contribution of increased use of each input by multiplying input growth by 
Sources  Whole 
Economy 






           
GDP Growth  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
           
Input  40.91  20.68  61.88  49.52  47.06 
           
    Labor  15.44  10.72  23.07  16.51  18.01 
   Capital  25.73  9.96  38.81  33.01  29.04 
           
Sectoral 
Productivity 
41.63  79.32  38.12  50.48  52.94 
           
Structural Change  17.47         















its production elasticity. Productivity growth in the sector is then calculated as the residual, the 
growth in GDP minus contribution of the growth in inputs. Contributions of sectoral 
productivity growth and increased use of inputs in the entire economy are calculated as a 
weighted (by GDP shares) average of their respective contributions in each sector.  
Structural change contributed 1.7 percentage points to aggregate GDP growth, and 
accounted for 17 percent of the total GDP growth rate of 9.9 percent per year from 1978 to 
1995. This share seems comparable to those reported by Maddison (1998), World Bank 
(1997) and Wang (1999).
14 
For the economy as a whole, 41.6 percent of total GDP growth was from sectoral 
productivity growth, while 41 percent was from the increased use of inputs.  Total factor 
productivity growth (total growth in output minus aggregate input growth, or the sum of the 
                                                            
14 Maddison (1998) provided a crude measure of the impact of labor reallocation 
on GDP growth. He attributed 0.92 percentage point of the annual GDP growth (or 21 
percent) to labor reallocation from 1952 to 1978, and 1.44 percentage points (or 19 
percent) from 1978 to 1995.  However, the average (instead of marginal) productivity of 
labor was used in calculating the impact.  He recognized that his approach was very rough 
and pointed out that there is a need for more sophisticated analysis of structural-shift 
effects that require disaggregated information on the physical and human capital stock, 
which is the approach used in the present study.  
World Bank (1997) estimates that the contribution from labor reallocation was 
about 1.0 percentage points to GDP growth (or about ten percent of the total growth) 
between 1985 to 1994. However, the methodology used is not clear to the authors. The 
footnote on the methodology (pp. 107) was missing in the study.  In the exercise of 
projecting the future growth of the Chinese economy in the same study, A simple CGE 
model was applied to simulate the impact of resources reallocation on GDP growth.  The 
model assumes no changes in sectoral technologies, and assumes a perfect capital 
allocation in the base year and a declining friction of distortion during projection period.  
These assumptions are largely ad hoc, and are proved to be inappropriate by the evidence 
obtained from the present study. 
Wang (1999) claimed that from 1979 to 1997, the increased TFP due to labor 
shifts contributed about eight percent of total GDP growth (7.7 percent between 1979 to 




contributions of sectoral productivity growth and structural change) for the economy as a 
whole accounts for 59% of total GDP growth.  This share is much higher than Maddison’s 
estimate of 30 percent, and slightly higher than the World Bank estimate of 43-46 percent.
15  
Within the agriculture sector, growth in productivity explains nearly 80 percent of 
sectoral GDP growth. This figure seems very high when compared with previous studies. Fan 
(1991) attributes 16 percent of total output growth in agriculture to technical change and 27 
percent to institutional reforms for the period of 1965-85. But Fan's study covers the period in 
which agricultural production was institutionally constrained (e.g., the cultural revolution 
period from 1966 to 1976). Moreover, the contribution of both institutional and technical 
change (43 percent) in Fan's study can be regarded as growth in productivity in the current 
study. In Fan and Pardey's study, these two effects plus a residual accounted for 75.8 percent 
during 1979-84 and 79.9 percent from 1985 to 1993. Thus, considering all these factors, the 
estimated contribution of productivity growth to output growth differs little from other 
studies.
16  
In urban industry, sectoral productivity growth accounts for 38 percent of sectoral 
GDP growth from 1978 to 1995, while increased input use accounts for 62 percent. Increased 
capital input alone accounts for more than 49 percent of total growth, while labor growth 
accounts for only 23 percent. Jefferson et al. (1992) also concluded that a large share (or more 
                                                            
15 Other TFP contribution estimates include 41.6 percent from 1979 to 1994 (Hu 
and Khan, 1996), 39.9 percent from 1979 to 1995 (Li et al., 1996), and 29.3 percent from 
1980 to 1986 (Bosworth et al., 1995). Kim and Lau, however, estimated a technical 
regress (or negative productivity growth) in the pre-1990 Chinese economy. We believe 
that the data they used, particularly for GDP and capital stock, are not appropriately 
constructed. 
16 Other studies on the topic include Huang and Rozelle (1996) and Zhang and 
Carter (1997).  
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than 70 percent) of output growth from 1980 to 1988 was from increased use of inputs, 
particularly capital. They also concluded that the difference in input contributions between 
state and collective industries and between the periods 1980-84 and 1984-88 was insignificant, 
although collective industry grew much faster than state industry.  
The annual growth rate of urban services was nearly 50% higher than that of urban 
industry. Growth in sectoral productivity accounts for 51 percent of the total growth, and the 
remainder is accounted for by increased use of inputs. Growth in capital explains about 33 
percent, while growth in labor accounts for 17 percent. There have been no studies of the 
urban service sectors, so it is impossible to compare our estimates with others. 
The rapid growth in rural enterprises is explained equally by the increased use of 
inputs (47 percent) and improvement in total factor productivity (53 percent). In terms of 
percentage of contribution to GDP growth, productivity growth is in the same range as for the 
urban industry and service sectors, but in terms of absolute contribution to GDP growth it is 
the highest among all sectors. Growth in productivity contributed more than 12 of the total of 
22 percentage points of GDP growth in rural enterprises over 1978-95. The contributions are 
3.9 percent, 3.0 percent, and 5.6 percent for agriculture, urban industry, and urban services, 
respectively.  
Our initial reaction to these results was that we may have overestimated productivity 
growth in the rural enterprise sector, considering its lower technology level, but several prior 
studies also reach the same conclusion. Svejnar (1990) suggests that Chinese rural enterprises 
have experienced rapid technical progress, and that they seem to operate under mildly 
increasing returns to scale. Jefferson (1993) and Jefferson et al (1996) found that rural 
enterprises outpaced state-owned enterprises in growth of TFP during the 1980s, surpassing  
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them in absolute level of TFP by the end of the period. Dong and Putterman (1997) concluded 
that productivity of rural enterprises increased at between six and nine percent per year during 
1984-89, using time-series, firm-level data and an analytical framework of a frontier 






In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework that explicitly incorporates the 
contribution to aggregate growth of reallocation of resources across sectors. We used new data 
on GDP by sectors at the provincial level for 1978-1995 to estimate sectoral production 
functions that incorporate the possibility of biased technical change. Using the estimated 
parameters and a computational procedure for calculating the “allocatively efficient” level of 
GDP, we found that about 17 percent of aggregate growth in China over this period is due to 
structural change—shifting resources from lower to higher productivity sectors. This 
efficiency gain is attributed mainly to intersectoral labor movements. There were severe policy 
constraints on capital mobility, and capital reallocation appears to have actually hindered 
efficiency.  
Sectoral productivity growth accounts for 42 percent of aggregate growth, which is 
relatively low when compared with the experience of developed countries.
17  However, in 
absolute terms, TFP growth contributed 4.2 percentage points to the aggregate annual growth 
rate, which is very high by any international standard. The increased use of inputs accounts for 
41 percent of growth. Growth in labor input explains only a small part of China’s rapid 
economic growth (15%), while capital growth explains more than 26 percent.  
The results of this study support an optimistic view of prospects for future economic 
growth in China. The continuing large differences in both labor and capital productivity across  
                                                            
17 For many developed countries, increased productivity often accounts for more 
than half of the total economic growth (Chenery et al. 1986).  
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sectors suggests that China still has great potential for further efficiency gains through 
continued structural change. To realize this potential, however, many restrictions on the 
intersectoral movement of resources need to be removed. For example, higher capital 
returns in rural areas (in both rural enterprises and agriculture) suggest that more 
aggressive government policies should be sought to increase investment there, or at least 
not hinder their movement. Such policies will not only improve overall economic 
performance, but also narrow the development gap and inequality between the rural and 
urban sectors. Similarly, the government should also encourage labor movement from 
agriculture to rural enterprises, urban industry, and service sectors as labor productivity in 
these sectors continues to be much higher than in the agriculture sector. 
The results indicate that intersectoral differences in marginal returns to capital have 
grown during the reform period. The puzzle is why there has not been more investment in 
higher productivity sectors such as rural enterprises and agriculture. One plausible explanation 
is the sluggish reform of the financial sector in China. Efficient capital markets that can funnel 
new investment to sectors with higher returns still need to be developed.  
The results also show the dramatic role of technical change in fostering rapid growth 
in China. It may well be that serious reform efforts allowed the economy to exploit 
opportunities that had long been present but could not be pursued in the earlier system of 
command planning. The results concerning the continuing role for structural change indicate 
that such opportunities are not exhausted. However, possibilities for “easy” increases in 
productivity may well be more difficult to find in the future. To maintain the historically high 
rates of aggregate growth in the future undoubtedly requires increased investment in R&D, 
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